Seidman begins by blaming the current
governmental crisis, incredibly, on "obedience to the Constitution," which he
describes as containing "archaic, idiosyncratic and downright evil provisions."
He does, however, lament that when some wise government official reaches a
decision on what will benefit the country, he is likely to be stymied by this
document. Seidman expresses doubt about the rationality of letting our wise
official be dissuaded by the views of "a group of white propertied men who have
been dead for two centuries, knew nothing of our present situation, acted
illegally under existing law and thought it was fine to own
slaves."
It is amusing to note Seidman's hypocrisy as he takes the authority of this hypothetical 'government official' for granted while he sneers at the authority and smears the characters of men like Madison. Don't dwell on that double standard for too long, however, else you'll miss the real sleight of hand: the insinuation that belief in constitutional government amounts to faith in the personal authority of the founders -- that constitutional government has nothing to do with individual liberty. By launching into this ad hominem abuse of the Founding Fathers, Seidman hopes to distract his readers from noticing that without a constitution there would be no restraint on the government and that officials would be free to act on the expediency of the moment.
But don't worry, says Seidman, you can have your Constitution and eat it too, "We should continue to follow those requirements" -- he is referring to principles like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the rule of law -- "out of respect, not obligation."
Suppose we nullified laws prohibiting homicide: would we then expect people generally to continue to respect those abandoned laws? Why then should we expect government officials to continue to respect abandoned constitutional principles? Professor Seidman provides no answer.
We can even keep, he says, constitutional features such as finite terms of office, a bicameral congress (these last two are "better left settled," apparently), checks and balances, and "an elite body like the Supreme Court."
Absent the Constitution, why would term limits not change? Absent the Constitution, why would Congress remain bicameral? If these matters are "better left settled," why change matters like which house can raise taxes? Absent the Constitution, by what process are unsettled matters to be settled? Absent the Constitution and the separation of powers codified therein, how are Congress and the States to restrain the President? Absent the Constitution, by what standard or authority is "an elite body like the Supreme Court" to rule on the legitimacy or otherwise of laws and executive actions? Professor Seidman provides no answer to any of these questions.
A Professor of Constitutional Law is doubtless aware that there are historical precedents of elected governments that were not constitutionally limited and that there are eminently sensible reasons why those "archaic, idiosyncratic and downright evil" framers of the Constitution did not emulate them. Why then does Seidman take such an absurd position? He states his motives with perfect clarity in his concluding paragraph, "[P]erhaps the dream of a country ruled by "We the people" is impossibly utopian."
Obviously, if men cannot rule themselves then they must be ruled by others -- by an unlimited government. How does Seidman hope to reach this destination? Via the false promise of unlimited democracy: "[B]efore abandoning our heritage of self-government, we ought to try extricating ourselves from constitutional bondage so that we can give real freedom a chance."
The alternative is simple: constitutionally limited government (which Seidman describes as "constitutional bondage") or tyranny. Professor Seidman prefers the latter -- and so do the editors of the New York Times.
It is amusing to note Seidman's hypocrisy as he takes the authority of this hypothetical 'government official' for granted while he sneers at the authority and smears the characters of men like Madison. Don't dwell on that double standard for too long, however, else you'll miss the real sleight of hand: the insinuation that belief in constitutional government amounts to faith in the personal authority of the founders -- that constitutional government has nothing to do with individual liberty. By launching into this ad hominem abuse of the Founding Fathers, Seidman hopes to distract his readers from noticing that without a constitution there would be no restraint on the government and that officials would be free to act on the expediency of the moment.
But don't worry, says Seidman, you can have your Constitution and eat it too, "We should continue to follow those requirements" -- he is referring to principles like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the rule of law -- "out of respect, not obligation."
Suppose we nullified laws prohibiting homicide: would we then expect people generally to continue to respect those abandoned laws? Why then should we expect government officials to continue to respect abandoned constitutional principles? Professor Seidman provides no answer.
We can even keep, he says, constitutional features such as finite terms of office, a bicameral congress (these last two are "better left settled," apparently), checks and balances, and "an elite body like the Supreme Court."
Absent the Constitution, why would term limits not change? Absent the Constitution, why would Congress remain bicameral? If these matters are "better left settled," why change matters like which house can raise taxes? Absent the Constitution, by what process are unsettled matters to be settled? Absent the Constitution and the separation of powers codified therein, how are Congress and the States to restrain the President? Absent the Constitution, by what standard or authority is "an elite body like the Supreme Court" to rule on the legitimacy or otherwise of laws and executive actions? Professor Seidman provides no answer to any of these questions.
A Professor of Constitutional Law is doubtless aware that there are historical precedents of elected governments that were not constitutionally limited and that there are eminently sensible reasons why those "archaic, idiosyncratic and downright evil" framers of the Constitution did not emulate them. Why then does Seidman take such an absurd position? He states his motives with perfect clarity in his concluding paragraph, "[P]erhaps the dream of a country ruled by "We the people" is impossibly utopian."
Obviously, if men cannot rule themselves then they must be ruled by others -- by an unlimited government. How does Seidman hope to reach this destination? Via the false promise of unlimited democracy: "[B]efore abandoning our heritage of self-government, we ought to try extricating ourselves from constitutional bondage so that we can give real freedom a chance."
The alternative is simple: constitutionally limited government (which Seidman describes as "constitutional bondage") or tyranny. Professor Seidman prefers the latter -- and so do the editors of the New York Times.
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